[POST] Iran socializing the risk

The regime signals its desire for an off-ramp

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At this point, whenever Trump says two weeks, I anticipate two days — and vice versa.

No surprise for me on the timing of the bunker-busting strikes, as Israel was signaling pretty obviously on Thursday that it was expecting Trump to act this weekend.

Now, it gets truly interesting and we discover who’s really invested in which outcomes.

Trump clearly wants out of this fight ASAP, but with a declarable win, which he can now claim in any future settlement on the basis of “bombing them to the negotiating table.” Did he need to do that? Nope. Does it shut the door on Iran’s reach for the bomb? Hard to imagine.

But … it could/should(?) satisfy Netanyahu and Israel for now, although they remain the wag-the-dog wild card here. On that score, I would be completely unsurprised if Israel killed the Supreme Leader in the next few days as a coup de grâce blow.

You want new negotiations? How about some new negotiators to go with that?

Until you remove the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the right sort of house-breaking deal Israel and the US would demand of Iran seems implausible. That guy just can’t disavow his entire life and reign — and, at age 87, I suspect nothing will move him to do so. This is one of those cases where a new path requires a new (supreme) leader.

So it becomes a matter of will no one rid me of this turbulent priest?

If I am Israel, now is that time.

Get a new guy on top, get a new attitude established, and make the deal happen.

What is the plausible deal?

End of conflict, of course, plus some acceptable package that sees Iran:

• Accept zero uranium enrichment (with that possibly supplied by some trusted third party — a realistic way to give Russia a “responsible role” and/or seat at the table)

• Restrict its ballistic missile program (with China logically stepping in as the new and transparent supplier of advanced air defense capabilities to Iran, obviating that requirement), and

• End its support to regional proxies (with the PG monarchies promising, like they have already with Syria, to become suitable mentoring agents for these regional players suddenly “orphaned” by Iran).

In short, Iran needs to get out of the threatening-Israel business, which is the real ask here (not the nukes fear). Likewise, the serious underwriting of Iran’s brighter future needs to be delivered by closer-in great powers (Russia, Turkey, India, China, PG monarchies, etc.). Yes, America can ditch the sanctions like Trump did with Syria, but we shouldn’t lead this reconnection project whatsoever — and won’t.

That’s the reasonable path forward, but — again — it’s one very hard to imagine with Khamenei still on the throne.

Yes, we know that’s just too regime-changey for the US and others. But that’s clearly not an issue for Israel, so - again — if I’m them, it’s go time on that score. That’s the sort of angry, parting kick-to-the-head of the guy lying prostrate in the parking lot after the victor’s friends finally pull him off the poor fellow’s limp body.

Short of that step, the glass-half-full argument is that Iran is clearly signaling it seeks an off-ramp by threatening (in a parliamentary vote … ooh!) to shut down the Strait of Hormuz.

If Iran really wanted to go uptempo, their missile attacks on US military bases in the region would be well underway, as would their advanced cyber attacks against the US homeland. They may still happen (most likely will in some performative fashion), but the fact that they weren’t automatically initiated does say something.

The same could be said of direct Iranian attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure.

By picking Hormuz, Iran is essentially socializing the risk to enlist the intervention of its Asian energy customer base — which is basically China.

China now buys roughly 90% of Iran’s oil exports, basically creating a monopsony relationship. India, meanwhile, imports virtually little oil from Iran right now and Turkey’s imports are but a small portion of its energy buy.

So, by threatening Hormuz, Tehran is basically calling in its China chit by making it their problem. This is the other side’s version of wag-the-dog dynamics.

So, overall, I think this whole thing can work out rather well, assuming the Khamenei removal opens the negotiating floodgates.

If that scenario insert doesn’t unfold, then I think we’re stuck in this doo-loop for a bit in which Israel won’t stop, the US can’t make Israel stop, and so the exchanges continue and Iran has to make good on its Hormuz threat, ratcheting up global pressure for some relieving deal.

Could Khamenei be talked into a deal acceptable to the US and EU?

Absent the Supreme Leader’s removal, I don’t yet locate Iran at that pain threshold, meaning Israel’s beatdown continues.

China can stop this mess if it truly wants by leaning on Iran to take a deal acceptable to the West, but the Chinese are always such diplomatic wimps at these moments, I’d have a hard time putting down a bet on that one.

Meanwhile, we should all remain cognizant of just how contained this “war” remains. Clearly, we’re way past performative strikes between the main combatants but the signaling remains clear: Iran wants an off-ramp, and now wants China to somehow force the issue.

So we wait and see, with only a modicum of uncertainty and fear.

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