[POST] Questions and Answers #7

An Ask Me Anything post

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And we’re off …

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Trey White

After reading PNM I used your terminology of Cold War was WW3 and the War with the Jihadis was WW4 (and explained it to anyone who would listen). Now you've dropped the WW's and Jihadis and I wonder why. Did you give up on trying to explain it?

Hmm. I guess I’d have to say that I never really liked the whole WW categorization schemes out there and staked my position back then only to distinguish myself. Left to my own devices, I never would have used the formulation.

But yes, in PNM, I described the Cold War as a sort of never-fully-consummated WWIII — or one that went virtual thanks to nuclear weapons. It served primarily as a force-planning model — the “Big One” (p. 60). Later (p. 84), I call it the long-anticipated outcome (“system-level violence”) of the Cold War (which it was in people’s minds — all that “duck and cover” stuff in their childhood). Finally (p. 151), I refer to the end of the Cold War as essentially solving the WWIII scenario.

What I don’t find in looking back at the text is any description of WWIV per se. I describe the post-9/11 security environment and the U.S.-led Global War on Terror as a new kind of global conflict, or one centered on integrating unstable regions and combating transnational threats. But I didn’t adopt any World War IV terminology, which many others did.

If anything, the book suggests that I wasn’t really into that sort of history parsing. See, for example, the section entitled “Why I Hate the Arc of Instability” (pp. 179-190), which I end with the following:

The Core’s political case for integrating the Gap’s regions cannot be defined by fear but must reflect a system-level understanding of the increasingly symbiotic economic relationship that evolves between the two. Over time, the Core will need the Gap as much as the Gap needs the Core. Our security strategies and the language we use to enunciate them must reflect this larger understanding of how the Core and Gap inevitably come together out of enlightened self-interest.

Not exactly WWIV talk, I would counter.

So, I guess I plead guilty to no longer talking about WW categorization schemes but I plead innocent at selling the GWOT as a de facto WWIV, because such language, as I note in the “Arc of Instability” portion of the book, would be unuseful.

My larger answer is this: What I have never abandoned is describing the North-South integration logic and requirement. Back in PNM, the GWOT was the primary rationale and I ran with that. Now, the primary rationales are different — more profound, I would argue (climate change, demographic transitions, rise of global majority middle class located more in South than in North).

So, the grand historical narrative (North-South integration) remains my throughline, adjusted over time to account for strategic rationalizations as they come and go.

Thanks for the question. It helped me clarify my own thinking.

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Michael Ryan

Is a truly idyllic peace between US/China feasible, or as great powers must it always, at minimum, feature the sort of soft antagonism and jibing that we see pop up in headlines here and there -- any historical precedent for #1 and #2 just hugging it out?

Sure, see the Churchill-FDR special bond that generated the “special relationship” that continues — however muted — to this day. That was the Brits letting their global empire degrade gracefully enough without pulling us into useless conflicts (like Ike passing on the Suez Crisis) — unlike the French who bequeathed us Vietnam (our mistake, yes, but they helped big-time).

I guess I would also say that the broader transatlantic relationship can be similarly appreciated, even as it grows more competitive now in this triangular strategic environment (North America v Europe v East Asia).

I would also say that there are good reasons to hope that our current rebalancing of global roles (moving from market-maker to more market-player) gives the present situation some flexibility — as in, as America “dumps” Europe, Europe engages China as balancing move, and so maybe we settle in peacefully to this three-way friendly competition.

And, honestly, sans Taiwan, I see no reason why that wouldn’t be the natural default case — and not any Thucydides Trap in which #1 must fight #2.

And no, I'm not talking about the CCP must fall for America and China to be friends. Until Xi came along and made himself prez-for-life, the whole China-US thing was pretty chill, in large part because we took comfort and confidence from the reality that the Chinese leadership would always go a generation younger every ten years. Really, it was a brilliant system that fit China well as a culture and civilization.

But now we have Xi and we must unfortunately entertain some truly stupid and pointless scenarios — like igniting a quasi-WWIII scenario over Taiwan. Why? Here, the logic gets weak: They need to take Taiwan by year X because it’s the ### anniversary of …

Really? That’s it for the logic of blowing up the world? An anniversary?

It’s that sort of he said, she said (in reply) bullshit that drives me nuts, because, whatever Taiwan’s path, it does not merit a WWIII outcome.

Stepping back a bit more: I would expect a post-Xi China to go back to its semi-competitive leadership model defined by generations. Once that happens, I’m not seeing the inherent problem in the superpower relationship with either Europe or the US.

Yes, China will compete and compete hard, and yes, they will favor a level of social control we find unacceptable, but this is not better-dead-than-red-level logic, which was always nuts to begin with.

So, short answer … yeah, we can be friends with China and still compete, and Thucydides can just fade into history. That path is entirely plausible and do-able. We just need to avoid this TAIWAN = WWIII logic, which is a bizarre leftover from the Cold War.

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Rob Keel

With the US taking a step back from addressing global warming, does the the north south migration intensify or stall? In 4 years will the pendulum swing back?

I would say the two are unrelated. Climate change marches on with or without the US caring. Adaptation and mitigation both march on in a global manner, with or without the US. The Green energy revolution likewise … marches on, just to China’s greater advantage.

We in the West can depress South-to-North migration in the meantime, but the structural logic there regarding demographics doesn’t exactly change either — no matter however belligerent we become before succumbing to the logic that says this is NOT the way forward.

The same is true for the shifting of consumption growth from North to South.

All three of my big structural shifts from America’s New Map are simply unstoppable at this point. We can be there to influence and shape and exploit, or we can sideline ourselves, leaving the field to others. Just understand that, in that pathway, others like China and India and Europe will step up out of all manner of self-interest.

Can we swing back almost completely come 2029 with a non-MAGA president? Sure, just like we switched gears in 2025.

For all this brave talk about Trumpism without Trump, I’m just not seeing it. I see the Great Man and I see the Minions. Remove the Great Man from the equation (the genius of our term limits) and the Minions are still minions at best.

Same is true for Russia with Putin and China with Xi.

We’re all investing far too much meaning into their present roles. I mean, what is the great historical record of despots winning out ad nauseam in our modern world? I’m just not seeing it.

Instead, they rise, they rule, and then apres moi, le deluge.

Keep an eye out for the Dengs, I say. They are lurking beneath the shiny surface. They represent our collective salvation.

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Rob Keel

Could NATO countries become the next nuclear block? Did Ukraine's vulnerability stem from giving up it's nuclear arsenal? Will NATO have to share nuclear arms to be a effective deterrent force in Europe? How would that change the dynamic with Europe, Russia, and the US?

I think you’re getting out ahead of your skis here.

First off, Ukraine with nukes … we’ll never know, but short of its joining NATO, I’m unsure having them would have stopped Russia, but quite possibly. Clearly, NATO did not follow up on its promises to back Ukraine in preventing such an event.

NATO already is a nuclear bloc, with the US, UK and France as pillars (i.e., each has it own stockpile and independent deterrence capability), with NATO sharing extended to Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Germany, and Turkey (meaning, they all have NATO nukes on their territories).

Based on the lack of use of nuclear weapons in Europe (perfect, to date), I would have to say NATO is already there on deterrence. The only question for now is whether or not new sharing hosts are designated closer to Russia. The candidates include … really just Poland.

Personally, I would be all for extending nuclear sharing to Poland.

Putin’s gotta pay for his crimes, and this would be a nice punishment.

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Rob Keel

It appears Ukraine is on a path to surrender or defeat if the administration stops sending arms to Kiev. When the Leviathan retreats isn't the new map forced to change?

First, I don’t see Trump going all the way on abandoning Ukraine, especially as it becomes that much more obvious that the big hold-up on settlement negotiations is Putin and not Zelensky.

Second, European NATO would still work to help Ukraine.

Third, Ukraine is no pushover and extremely clever in its transformational use of drones.

Fourth, at the rate Russia has been advancing, Moscow will claim all of Ukraine in … several decades.

Fifth, remember my admonition that there is a difference between Russia reclaiming old imperial holdings like Ukraine and threatening NATO members like Poland or the Baltics. In the great divorce that was the collapse of the Cold War, Europe got all the “step-children” while Russia — whether we like it or not — never gave up its claim on the “birth-children” (basically, the old Soviet republics OTHER THAN the Baltics, meaning states long held within the Russian Empire).

To me, then, the “loss” of Georgia or Ukraine isn’t all that much of a loss.

Moreover, I foresee a Russia coming apart post-Putin, not just politically but increasingly in terms of encroachment by the likes of China and India (and the renewed encroachment by Europe) as climate change remakes the old Russian empire. There’s just too much land and not enough people there for Russia to hold it together this century, in my opinion.

So, yes, new maps coming, but I’m not seeing Russia winning.

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Mark Evans

I hope that if the US stops supporting Ukraine, Europe will step up and Ukrainians will keep defending themselves. It's not just us. I imagine Ukrainians saying "you can have my country when you pry it from my cold, dead fingers after our last round has been fired."

I agree completely.

See my answer above for more support for your position.

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John J. Brown

Hi, I think your idea of a SysAdmin and Strategic forces is great idea. I’m interested in if you thoughts about our foreign service (state) and clandestine intelligence (CIA) on how you would split their duties diplomacy, intelligence gathering, aide distribution?

Would these just be folded into your SysAdmin and Strategic forces? If so would these management towers be DOD and State, with CIA being eliminated?

Also any thoughts on the domestic police services? Should FBI, ATF, DHS (including secret service, CBP, etc.), DEA, and US Marshals? Should they be reviewed and maybe separate into more functional alignments.

See my TED talk for how I divide up “the kids.”

In general, and based on what I am seeing today (understand that I developed the Leviathan and SysAdmin concepts 25 years ago!), I guess I still see a DoD retreating into Big War mode while DHS steps up increasingly in terms of an expanding SysAdmin role, with DoD sharing more and more assets (mostly people) with an ever-rising DHS (like lotsa National Guard working the border today and the US military being pulled in the direction of future wars against the drug cartels).

If I had to shorthand it: under Trump, I see a very “lethal” DoD largely in deterrence mode vis-a-vis the Eastern Hemisphere and an increasingly militarized DHS playing SysAdmin in the Western Hemisphere.

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Jeffrey Itell

It appears that the US Navy was just soundly whooped by the Houthis, with the US suing for peace. What are the geopolitical implications? What are the implications for the military as it recalibrates how to project power and defend allies/the global order?

A rather bold formulation, I would say.

The Houthis are what they are today as a geopolitical threat-actor primarily due to Iranian support. Kill that support and they no longer pose much of a threat. A resurrected Obama nuclear deal with Iran — in the works as I type — would solve much of this problem.

Having said that, have the Houthis shown how a small non-state group can threaten global trade corridors to a stunning degree? Yes, they did.

But, again, I’m not seeing a plethora of Houthi-like groups out there pulling this off without some great power-sponsorship, so it’s not like they’re untouchable.

Meanwhile, everybody who is anybody is moving toward drone-heavy force structures, which present their own solutions to Houthi-like threats.

So, I guess I’m not seeing the big disruptive development here that you are. We got “whooped” only in a cost sense with the Houthis. Once we symmetrize our capabilities more fully, that cost-loss goes away.

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David Blair

With China's impending demographic decline can the US just sit back & wait the Chinese out?

Sure, if you are cool with writing off the next half-century or so.

Me, I am not.

Rather than sitting out anything, I would argue, as I do in ANM, that we should be bulking up through hemispheric integration — another long-term national project but we need one to cohere our increasingly incoherent national identity.

Americans are natural frontier-integrators. We need to get back to that ethos in a manner appropriate to the modern world we created.

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